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THE JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT AND NON-
ASSERTION OF PATENTS PROVISIONS:




Abstract: In recent decades, Japan has strengthened its antimonopoly regulations.
Now, a country that historically favored internal collusion continues to develop a
stringent antimonopoly regime that encourages competition. The Japan Fair Trade
Commission ("JFTC") enforces the Japanese Act Concerning the Prohibition of Private
Monopoly and the Maintenance of Fair Trade ("Antimonopoly Act") and its provisions
dealing with unfair trade practices. The JFrC takes a strong stance in enforcement of the
Act and violators follow its recommendations.
The JFTC has charged Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") with abuse of a
dominant bargaining position and unfair trade practices in its use of restrictive provisions,
such as non-assertion of patents provisions, in contracts and licensing agreements.
Microsoft has removed the non-assertion provision from future contracts of its own
accord, but indicated that it will continue to fight the JFTC's recommendation that the
provisions be removed from existing contracts. Cooperating with the JFTC and
removing the provision will lead to an improved image in Japan and will ensure that
personal computer manufacturers will continue to develop new and innovative
technologies, but removing it may also lead to backlash and an influx of litigation against
Microsoft. In light of the plethora of potential problems that could result from a finding
of illegality, Microsoft should continue to defend the non-assertion of patents provision
and contest any unfavorable rulings from the JFTC.
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2004, the Japan Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") raided
Microsoft's Japan offices' to investigate complaints filed by Japanese
original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs").2 Over the ensuing months,
t The author would like to thank Professor Robert Gomulkiewicz of the University of Washington
School of Law for his guidance and suggestions. The author also thanks the editorial staff of the Pacific
Rim Law & Policy Journal for its hard work and editorial contributions. The author would like to dedicate
this Comment to her continuously supportive family and her wonderful husband, Juan Garcia.
1 See P-I News Services, Microsoft Offices in Tokyo Raided by Japan Trade Officials, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 26, 2004, at E2; Bloomberg News, Regulators Conduct Search of Microsoft's
Office in Tokyo, N.Y. TEMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at W1.
2 Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Commission, The JF'C Renders a Recommendation to Microsoft
Corporation 4-5 (July .3, 2004), available at http://www2.jftc.go.jp/e-page/pressreleases/2004/july/
040713.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter JFTC Press Release]. The PC
manufacturers lodged complaints with the JFTC against Microsoft out of fear that Microsoft was using
their patented audio-visual technology without having to pay royalties, and they could not sue Microsoft for
infringing their patents. See generally Japan Fair Trade Commission, Shinpan kaishi ketteisho [Decision to
Initiate Examination], Sept. 1, 2004 (on file with Journal) [hereinafter JFTC Decision] (discussing
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investigators from the JFTC conducted interviews and reviewed records to
investigate the allegations that a non-assertion of patents provision ("NAP"),
common to many of Microsoft's licensing agreements, violated Japan's Act
Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and the Maintenance of
Fair Trade of 1947 ("Antimonopoly Act'")3 and constituted an unfair trade
practice.4 After completing the investigation, the JFTC challenged the
standard non-assertion of patents provision in Microsoft's licensing
agreements.5 The challenged provision potentially allows Microsoft to use
proprietary, patented material without paying royalties to the patent owner.6
Licensors use the NAP provision to facilitate the settlement of patent
litigation,7 keep transaction costs down, and ensure the careful negotiation of
licensing agreements.
8
In July 2004, the JFTC issued a recommendation 9 that Microsoft
remove the provision from all past, present and future contracts.'0 Microsoft
deleted the provision from its standard form licensing contract, but refused
to eliminate it from existing agreements, thus beginning a legal battle with
the JFTC. 11
The Antimonopoly Act promotes competition and fair trade in a
country that historically encouraged collusion.' Japan has strengthened the
Microsoft's potential Antimonopoly Act violations); Japan Fair Trade Commission, Maikurosofuto
k6porlshon ni taisuru shinpan kaishi kettei nitsuite [On the Decision to Initiate the Examination for
Microsoft Corporation], Sept. 3, 2004 (on file with Journal) (notice introducing the JFrC decision against
Microsoft).
3 Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi Oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act Concerning
Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1947 as amended.
[hereinafter Antimonopoly Act].
4 JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 1.
Id.
6 Id. at 4-5 (indicating that the NAP would likely preclude OEMs from recouping expenditures and
would allow Microsoft to infringe on their patents).
BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD & DENNIS P. O'REILLEY, DRAFrING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 17 (4th
ed. 1998)(1971).
8 Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Statement by Microsoft Corporation on Japanese Fair Trade
Commission Recommendation (July 13, 2004), available at http://www.microsoft.comlpresspass/
press/2004/Ju1O4/07-13JFTCStatementPR.asp (last visited May 31, 2005) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter
Statement by Microsoft].
9 While this type of recommendation decision is not binding unless accepted by the other party
involved, it is nonetheless a result of a lengthy investigation by JFTC into Microsoft's licensing practices.
See JFTC Decision, supra note 2.
'0 JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 5-6.
11 See Microsoft Filing Complaint Against Japan FTC, JIJI PRESS ENGLISH NEWS SERV., July 26,
2004; Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8 (indicating that Microsoft will keep the provision in existing
licensing agreements).
12 Alex Y. Seita & Jiro Tamura, The Historical Background of Japan's Antimonopoly Law, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REv. 115, 128-30. See also HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 300 (Oxford University Press 1999)
(1992) (noting that government actions fostered monopolies); MITSUO MATSUSHITA & JOHN D. DAVIS,
INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW 1 (1990) (stating that free enterprise and competition
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Antimonopoly Act to foster competition and ensure growth and
development,' 3 and has also been increasingly vigilant in the Antimonopoly
Act's enforcement.1 4 The JFTC's recommendation marks the first instance
of a regulatory body challenging a non-assertion provision under antitrust
law.15 The section of the Antimonopoly Act forbidding unfair trade practices
(under which the non-assertion of patents provision falls) has traditionally
been vague, requiring guidelines to aid in its interpretation.' 6  Historically,
the JFTC has concentrated its enforcement efforts on more egregious
violations like monopolies, price fixing, and unreasonable restraint of
trade.' 7 In contrast, the JFTC viewed prohibition of unfair trade practices as
a preventative measure against monopolies rather than a violation in its own
right.18 Also, unfair trade practices are harder to identify and more flexible
than more obvious violations.' 9 Due to Microsoft's large market share and
high visibility, the Japan Fair Trade Commission decided to enforce the
unfair trade practices provision against it.20 Microsoft will continue to fight
are relatively new concepts to Japanese businesses); Hiroshi Iyori, Antitrust and Industrial Policy in Japan:
Competition and Cooperation, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: AMERICAN AND
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES 56, 61 (Gary R. Saxonhouse & Kozo Yanamura, eds., 1986) (discussing Japan's
economic history and proclivity for collusion)..
13 PETER MORICI, ANTITRUST IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM: RECONCILING U.S., JAPANESE AND
EU APPROACHES 51 (2000). See also, Yoichiro Hamabe, Changing Antimonopoly Policy in the Japanese
Legal System: An International Perspective, 28 INT'L LAW. 903, 907-909 (1994) (discussing the JF'C's
reasons for its belief in the importance of the Antimonopoly Act).
14 Makoto Kurita, Effectiveness and Transparency of Competition Law Enforcement: Causes and
Consequences of a Perception Gap Between Home and Abroad on the Antimonopoly Act Enforcement in
Japan, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 387, 391-92 (2004). With an increased budget and heightened
scrutiny toward anti-competitive activities, the JFTC has begun enforcing the Antimonopoly Act more
forcefully. See H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Competition Law and Patent Protection in Japan: A Half-Century of
Progress, A New Millennium of Challenges, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 71, 104 (2002).
15 But cf., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670-74 (1969); Foster v. Hallco Mfg Co., 947 F.2d
469, 475 (Fed. Cit. 1991); Case 65/86, Bayer AG v. Sullhofer, 1988 E.C.R. 5249, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 182,
186-87 (1988). The European Communities Court of Justice and the United States validated a similar
clause in certain circumstances, but not under antitrust law. Also, these jurisdictions indicated that such
clauses would be examined on a case-by-case basis.
16 Antimonopoly Act, supra note 3, § 19. For definitions of terms and guidelines on interpreting the
Antimonopoly Act, see Guidelines For Patent and Know-How Licensing, produced by the Japan Fair Trade
Commission. JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HoW LICENSING
AGREEMENTS UNDER THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT 19 (1999), available at http://www2.jftc.go.jp/e-
page/legislation/ama/patentandknow-how.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR
PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING].
17 John 0. Haley, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement: Implications for United States Trade, 18 N. KY.
L. REV. 335, 342 (1991).
18 MATSUSHITA & DAVIS, supra note 12, at 8-9. Matsushita also notes that the control of unfair trade
practices is related to consumer protection laws. Segments of the unfair trade practices section of the
Antimonopoly Act are specifically consumer protection measures. Id.
'9 HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN 107-08
(1994). Hiroshi Iyori is a former Commissioner of the JFTC.
20 See JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 2.
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the JFTC and defend the NAP provision, arguing that the European Union
and the United States validated it and that it does not violate antitrust laws.
21
Parties usually settle with the JFTC and accept its preliminary
decisions.22 If Microsoft continues to fight the ruling, the JFTC will likely
choose to enforce its original request that Microsoft remove the provision
from existing contracts, because the JFFC tries to fully establish the
existence of a violation before issuing a recommendation. While the NAP
provision is not necessarily per se illegal, when used in conjunction with
24Microsoft's bargaining power, it may violate the Antimonopoly Act.
Microsoft has many good reasons to defend the provision, despite potential
damage to its image in Japan.
This Comment asserts that Microsoft should defend the NAP
provision. Part II looks at non-assertion of patents provisions, their utility,
and the potential anti-competitive implications they embody. Part III
examines the Antimonopoly Act, its history, and pertinent provisions and
purposes of the Act that apply to Microsoft's current dilemma. Part IV
outlines the recent action of the JFTC against Microsoft and suggests
possible reasons for the JFIC's targeting of Microsoft. This Part will also
review Microsoft's reluctance to remove the provision from existing
agreements and analyze possible outcomes of Microsoft's potential courses
of action. Finally, Part V will analyze potential future implications of a
JFTC decision, including potential damage to Microsoft's image and market
share, and increased litigation as a result of the provision's removal, and
argue that Microsoft should continue to defend the provision and assert its
noncompetitive aspects.
21 See Michiyo Nakamoto, Microsoft Is Told To Alter Policy on Licenses in Japan Contracts, FIN.
TIMES, JULY 14, 2004, at 29; Yuri Kageyama, Microsoft in Battle with Japan Over Non-sue Clause, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at 62; Todd Zaun, World Business Briefing Asia: Japan: Microsoft Contract
Warning, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,2004, at WI.
22 JOHN 0. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS, 1947-1998, 116-
18 (2001); IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 19, at 221; see also CHRISTOPHER HEATH, THE SYSTEM OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION PREVENTION IN JAPAN 48 (2001) (noting that ninety percent of cases under the
Antimonopoly Act are resolved through "administrative guidance" versus formal adjudication).
23 IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 19, at 219-21.
24 See generally, GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING, supra note 16, at 17-19
(outlining when a restrictive contract provision becomes an unfair trade practice); JAPAN FAIR TRADE
COMMISSION, JFTC NOTIFICATION NO. 15, GENERAL DESIGNATIONS FOR UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 3-4
(June 18, 1982), available at http://www2.jftc.go.jp/e- page/legislation/ama/unfairtradepractices.pdf (last
visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter GENERAL DESIGNATIONS] (outlining the different violations that
constitute unfair trade practices).
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II. A NON-ASSERTION OF PATENTS PROVISION REPRESENTS BOTH A VALID
PROTECTION AND A POTENTIALLY ILLEGAL RESTRICTION
Companies use NAP provisions to prevent costly and lengthy patent
litigation and facilitate settlement of patent disputes between licensors and
25licensees. While such provisions prevent a licensee from asserting its
patent rights in some situations, they may also keep both the licensee and
licensor from being sued for potential patent infringement.26 They are also
often used in the context of cross-licensing agreements, and in these
situations, the licensor is also prevented from asserting patent rights.27
Although they have not been tested under antitrust laws, the European Union
and the United States examined clauses similar to the NAP provision and
upheld them in certain situations.28 However, courts in both the European
Union and United States indicate that the outcome may be different in other
situations. 29  Their decisions suggest that the NAP provision could
potentially be in violation of the laws of the United States and European
Union, but not necessarily contrary to antitrust laws. 30  Both the United
States and European Union had the opportunity to examine the NAP
provision under their respective antitrust laws during prior investigations and
litigation against Microsoft, and decided not to challenge it.
31
25 BRUNSVOLD & O'REILLEY, supra note 7, at 17.
26 See, e.g., 14B AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Patents § 196:90 (2004) (recommending that a licensee
consider using a "nonassertion clause" in licensing agreements).
27 1 GREGORY J. BATrERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, MULTIMEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY LICENSING
AGREEMENTS § 4:20 (2004).
28 See Case 66/85, Bayer AG v. Sullhofer, 1988 E.C.R. 5249, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 182, 186-87 (no-
challenge clauses are not per se illegal and warrant a case-by-case analysis); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653, 670-71 (1969) (indicating a policy of generally disfavoring restrictions on assertion of patent rights,
but upholding the non-assertion of patent rights in this case); Foster v. Hallco Mfg Co., 947 F.2d 469, 477
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
29 See Case 66/85, Bayer AG v. Sullhofer, 1988 E.C.R. 5249, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 182, 190; Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670-72 (1969); Foster v. Hallco Mfg Co., 947 F.2d 469,475-76 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
30 See generally Case 66/85, Bayer AG v. Sullhofer, 1988 E.C.R. 5287, 4 C.M.L.R. 182 (1988);
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Foster v. Hallco Mfg Co., 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (cases
indicating that restrictive provisions may be violations of the law in some circumstances).
31 In 1994, the United States Department of Justice and various individual states sued Microsoft
under the Sherman Antitrust Act for anticompetitive and monopolistic practices tied with its bundling of
Internet Explorer in its operating system, and its refusal to divulge source codes to OEMs. See U.S. v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-62 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Later, in a status report on Microsoft's compliance
with the final judgment, the Court indicated that the plaintiffs had not reached a conclusion as to whether
the NAP provision violated the terms of the final antitrust judgment, but they were satisfied that
Microsoft's prospective removal of the NAP provision remedied their concerns about compliance. See
Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance With the Final Judgments July 9, 2004, at 7, U.S. v.
Microsoft Corp., C.A. No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. 2004) [hereinafter Microsoft Joint Status Report]. In other
words, because Microsoft had already agreed to remove the NAP provision, it was no longer a concern to
the plaintiffs in the case. Id. Shortly thereafter, the Commission of European Communities decided a
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A. NAP Provisions Help Resolve Patent Infringement Actions and Are
Standard in Many Licensing Agreements
Part of the NAP provision's utility lies in the reduction of transaction
costs: if the likelihood of costly litigation is reduced, companies that license
their software, like Microsoft, can charge a lower price for the software
32license. A typical NAP provision includes the following language:
Company A agrees that Company A and its affiliates will not
assert during the term of this Agreement and thereafter, directly
or indirectly, any cause of action based, in whole or in part,
upon the purported infringement by Company B or its suppliers
or customers, mediate or immediate, during the terms of this
Agreement of: (i) any patent (including any utility patent,
design patent, patent of importation, patent of addition,
certificate of addition, certificate or model of utility) granted by
the United States or any other country; (ii) any reissue,
continuation, parent, division, extension, renewal, or
continuation-in-part of any of the foregoing.33
The inclusion of NAP provisions in treatises on technology licensing
evidences their commonality. 34 Although NAP provisions have utility, they
may be considered anti-competitive in various jurisdictions under certain
circumstances.
35
Use of the NAP provision initially served to ensure that computer
manufacturers would raise any intellectual property concerns they may have
before Microsoft shipped them a new version of Microsoft Windows.36 Its
original design was meant to balance "respect for intellectual property rights
with the avoidance of IP disputes, ensuring that computer manufacturers did
similar case against Microsoft tied with its bundling of media players, among other anticompetitive
practices. See Commission Decision of Mar. 24, 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft. The Court
similarly had the opportunity to examine restrictive licensing provisions, but did not mention NAP
provisions. Id.
32 See Michiyo Nakamoto, Companies Asia-Pacific: Microsoft Is Told to Alter Policy on Licences
Japan Contracts, FIN. TIMES UK, July 14, 2004.
33 BATIERSBY & GRIMES, supra note 27, § 4:20(3).
34 See generally BATTERSBY & GRIMES, supra note 27; BRUNSVOLD & O'RELLEY, supra note 7, at
17; STEVEN Z. SZCEZEPANSKI, 4 EcKSTRoM's LICENSING IN FOR. & DOM. OPS. (2004).
35 See SZCEZEPANSKI, supra note 34, § 31:32. The treatise notes that restrictions in licensing
agreements on asserting patent rights could be considered anti-competitive and might be a violation of the
Japanese Antimonopoly Act. Id. Generally, any jurisdiction in addition to Japan could potentially find the
use of a restrictive clause like this to be anticompetitive and a violation of antitrust laws. Id.
36 Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8.
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not ship a new version of Windows and then raise an IP concern years
later.",37 For many licensors, especially smaller companies, NAP provisions
are a vital protection. They ensure that these companies can protect
themselves from larger companies who license their software. They also
gain protection from a licensor company's attempts to assert its own patent
rights.38
B. NAP Provisions Provide Protection from Lawsuits But May Prevent
Licensees from Asserting Patent Rights
A licensing agreement between a software developer and an OEM
may include a non-assertion of patents provision to facilitate the settlement
of patent disputes and avoid potential litigation.39 Microsoft has used the
provision for more than ten years40 and other companies also include it in
their licensing agreements.4' Such licensing agreements can protect the
licensee who changes its product or develops a product similar to
Microsoft's software, since they often include reciprocal agreements not to
bring an action for patent infringement.42
The NAP provision has various advantages and disadvantages. For
example, it prevents computer manufacturers or other OEMs who sign it
from bringing an action based on suspected infringements of the licensee's
intellectual property rights by Microsoft.43  Technology developed by a
manufacturer merges into the operating system supplied by Microsoft when
it is loaded onto a machine. 4 The manufacturer may make improvements or
changes to the technology using its own patented devices to allow the
operating system and other technology on the computer to interact more
efficiently.4  Because the NAP provision prevents assertion of patent rights,
37 id.
38 See 14B AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Patents § 196:90 (2004).
39 See BRUNSVOLD & O'REILLEY, supra note 7, at 16-17; Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8.
40 See Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8.
41 The widespread use of NAP provisions is evidenced by its inclusion in licensing forms and
treatises. See generally, BRUNSVOLD & O'RELLEY, supra note 7; BATTERSBY & GRIMES, supra note 27;
SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 34; Lori Krauss, Copyright and Licensing Basics, 567 PLIIPAT 393, 418 (1999)
(presenting examples of treatises and licensing forms that include NAP provisions).
42 For example, a cross-licensing agreement often includes a NAP provision. In these types of
agreements, both companies agree not to assert their patent rights. See BArrERSBY & GRIMES, supra note
27, § 4:20.
43 Yuri Kageyama, Japan Orders Microsoft Deals Changed, CHI. SuN TIMES, July 14, 2004, at 78
[hereinafter Kageyama, Japan Orders].
See JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 4.
45 This essentially encompasses the assertion made by PC manufacturers that led to the investigation
of Microsoft. See JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 3. These Japanese OEMs feared Microsoft could
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it incentivizes licensees to fully inform themselves about Microsoft
technology when entering into a licensing agreement.4 6 It promotes the
settlement of patent disputes.47 Unfortunately, it also potentially prevents a
licensee from legitimately asserting rights over proprietary ideas and may
48
cause the licensee to lose royalty income. Despite the drawbacks, the
NAP provision is essential to averting costly infringement actions because it
can preclude both parties from bringing a patent infringement action against
the other during the terms of the licensing agreement.49 In this way, it helps
both the licensee and the licensor.
C. The United States and European Union Examined Restrictive
Provisions and Determined They Are Not Necessarily Legal in All
Circumstances
Both the U.S. Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have examined
clauses similar to the NAP provision. In Foster v. Hallco Manufacturing
Company,50 Foster attempted to assert his rights to a new device that he
claimed fell outside of the patent licensing agreement with Hallco. 51 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that there
was a strong public interest in the settlement of patent litigation, as it is time-
52consuming and expensive. In the interest of preserving finality of a
judgment, the court decided the case under theories of patent and contract
law and not under antitrust law. 53 The court found that the issue had already
been decided and Foster could not reassert his right to the device patents.
It did not decide, however, whether Foster could challenge the patent if the
device were materially different from those included in the agreement.
55
Therefore, the court validated the restrictive provision under a specific set of
circumstances.
use their proprietary technology in its media player due to the technology's incorporation into the operating
system when it was loaded onto the machines. Id.
46 See Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8.
41 See BRUNSVOLD & O'REtLLEY, supra note 7, at 17. See also RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF DODD,
MODERN LIcENsING LAW § 1:12 (2005) (noting that some licenses are driven primarily by avoiding
litigation about intellectual property rights).
48 JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 3-5. See also GuiDELNES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW
LICENSING, supra note 16, at 19.
49 See BATTERSBY & GRIMES, supra note 27, § 4:20.
50 Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
5' Id. at 472-73. Foster had already entered a settlement agreement and consent judgment with
Hallco conceding that Hallco owned the patents and that he was licensing them. Id.
52 Foster, 947 F.2d at 474-75.
13 Id. at 475.
5 Id.
" Id. at 482.
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The Supreme Court of the United States generally disfavors
restrictions on challenges to patent validity. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,56 a case
concerning non-assertion of patent rights, the Supreme Court made its
decision under patent law. The Court held that Adkins could not assert a
patent right over ideas he had allowed Lear, Inc. to use prior to his attempts
to patent those ideas. 7 The restrictive provision was upheld in this case
because Adkins had already allowed Lear, Inc. to use the patentable devices
before he got the patents. However, the Court noted it disfavored patent
restrictions and indicated that, under different circumstances, such restrictive
provisions may not have been upheld.58
The underlying issues in the above cases were attempts to challenge
the validity of a company's patent coupled with one's assertion of his or her
own patent rights. Accordingly, while the restrictive provisions were upheld
in these cases, it is possible, although unlikely, that the courts could
invalidate provisions restricting the exercise of patent rights under other
circumstances.59
The European Court of Justice validated a clause similar to a non-
assertion of patents provision in Bayer AG v. Sullhofer.60 The Court noted
that the provision itself does not necessarily constitute a barrier to trade61
and allowed its use in this case because it did not actually cause harm to the
62licensee. This suggests that a situation that harms the licensee could
potentially be a violation of European Union law.
Although the United States and the European Union have validated
clauses similar to Microsoft's NAP provision under laws other than antitrust,
the courts of both countries indicated that they intend to examine such
63provisions on a case-by-case basis. However, since the United States and
the European Union already had the chance to examine the provision under
antitrust laws64 and decided to forego the opportunity, they are unlikely to
56 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
7 Id. at 673-74.
I Id. at 670.
9 For an explanation of other policy concerns and the specific application of the Lear doctrine to
non-assertion provisions, see Norman E. Rosen, Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Pendulum. Recent
Developments at the Interface Between the Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws, 62 ANTTrRUST L.J.
669,687-92 (1994).
6 Case 66/85, Bayer AG v. Sullhofer, 1988 E.C.R. 5249, [199014 C.M.L.R. 182 (1988).61 Id. at 186.
62 Id. at 190.
63 See Case 66/85, Bayer AG v. Sullhofer, 1988 E.C.R. 5249; Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653
(1969); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See generally U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-62; Microsoft Joint Status Report, supra
note 31; Commission Decision of Mar. 24, 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft (U.S. and European
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challenge the provision under antitrust law.
NAP provisions have economic utility for many companies without
the bargaining power or market share of Microsoft. However, while
preventing costly patent infringement lawsuits, they also prevent patent
holders from asserting their rights should they make improvements to
Microsoft's programs, or should Microsoft's programs absorb their
proprietary information. This may discourage innovations for fear that the
technology will be taken without the payment of royalties. Also, there exists
a possibility that other jurisdictions might disfavor the NAP provision.
Thus, NAP provisions both possess economic utility for Microsoft and its
licensees, and potentially restrain innovation.
III. THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT MOVES THE JAPANESE ECONOMY FROM
COLLUSION TO COMPETITION
The Japanese government enacted the Antimonopoly Act in 1947
during the United States' post-World War II occupation. 65  The
Antimonopoly Act conformed to business values in Japanese society.66 It
aimed to create a stable democracy, encourage free and fair competition, and
67promote the creative initiative of entrepreneurs. Since its inception, Japan
has strengthened the Antimonopoly Act through several amendments, and its
enforcement has become a focal point of the JFTC.68 The JFTC is primarily
69responsible for enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act. It has processes in
place to investigate, issue cease and desist orders for perceived violations,
and impose penalties, although generally the penalty consists of a fine rather
than criminal charges. 70 Early in the Antimonopoly Act's history, the JFTC
was reluctant to enforce the Act stringently. In recent years, however, the
Commission antitrust decisions against Microsoft that did not encompass NAP provisions in their
judgments).
65 HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN, 6-11 (1983).
66 Harry First, Antitrust in Japan: The Original Intent, 9 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 3-4 (2000). The Act
conformed to business ideals such as encouraging economic growth and increasing market access. Id.
67 Hiroshi lyori, Competition Policy and Government Intervention in Developing Countries: An
Examination of Japanese Economic Development, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 35,39-41 (2002).
68 Kurita, supra note 14, at 391-92. For a brief treatment of a more recent surge in enforcement and
increased staffing and budget of the Japan Fair Trade Commission, the Antimonopoly Act's primary
enforcement mechanism, see Harris, supra note 14.
69 MIrSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN 98 (1993).
70 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 65-66 (H.
Stephen Harris et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST, COMPETrION LAWS].
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JFTC has begun to focus more on enforcement.7' Of particular concern is
the focus of recent enforcement actions on the abuse of a dominant
bargaining position.72
A. The Japanese Antimonopoly Act Was Initially a Collaboration
Between Japan and the United States
Competition laws did not spontaneously develop within Japanese
society, but originated from the demands of the United States during the U.S.
occupation after World War 11. 73 Indeed, the Japanese economic market did
not find its roots within ideals of fair competition.74 Before U.S. occupation,
Japan fostered collusion between companies, strong governmental control in
the form of trade associations, and protection from excessive internal
competition. 75  Japanese companies viewed foreign countries as their
primary source of competition and were willing to cooperate with each other
to increase profits and win the economic battle against foreign
corporations.
76
In the 1920s and 1930s, the government fostered the creation of
cartels 77 in order to ensure the success of domestic companies in the face of
competition from abroad.78  The recession and depression in the economy
during this period caused Japanese society to promote group welfare and
look unfavorably upon competition.79  The zaibatsu,8 °  or trade
71 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
ASSISTANT ATrORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 216 (2000)
[hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE INT'L COMPETITION POLICY]; see also Harris, supra note 14.
72 Antimonopoly Act, supra note 3, § 2(9)(v) (prohibiting as an unfair trade practice dealing with
another party by unjust use of one's bargaining position); see also Joshua A. Newberg, Technology
Licensing Under Japanese Antitrust Law, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 705,752-54 (2001) (outlining when
a dominant bargaining position exists).
73 KENJI SUZUKI, COMPETITION LAW REFORM IN BRITAIN AND JAPAN 18-19 (2002).
74 See IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 65, at 1-2; Gregory K. Bader, Note, The Keiretsu Distribution
System of Japan: Its Steadfast Existence Despite Heightened Foreign and Domestic Pressure for
Dissolution, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 365, 365-66 (1994); ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 15
(1970).
75 First, supra note 66, at 6-10; see also SUZUKI, supra note 73, at 18; lyori, supra note 12, at 61.
76 First, supra note 66, at 8-14.
77 HIROSHI IYORI, ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN JAPAN 3 (1969). For more information about
cartels during the period before U.S. occupation, see Takeo Kikkawa, Functions of Japanese Trade
Associations Before World War II: The Case of Cartel Organizations, in TRADE ASSOCIATIONS IN
BUSINESS HISTORY 60-65 (Hiroki Yamazaki & Matao Miyamoto eds., 1988).
78 Cartels are agreements between competing companies to restrict prices and product output, among
other forms of competition. HALEY, supra note 22, at 8-9.
'9 MICHAEL L. BEEMAN, PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION IN JAPAN: CHANGE AND
CONTINUITY IN ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY, 1973-1995, at 14-15 (2002).
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conglomerates, 81 were also prevalent in Japan prior to World War H. These
oligopolies absorbed failing companies and were responsible for ten to
twenty percent of market output in key areas such as manufacturing,
banking, and trade.82 Despite the promotion of cartels and existence of
zaibatsu during this era, rivalry and competition still existed.83 Regardless
of many overfly anti-competitive policies, new zaibatsu and smaller
manufacturing companies trickled into the market.84
During the U.S. occupation after World War II, U.S. directives and
Japanese legislation dissolved many of these cartels and zaibatsu.85 In 1947,
the Japanese government drafted the Antimonopoly Act.86  Although
prompted by U.S. influence during the occupation, the Antimonopoly Act
was authored by the planning section of the General Affairs Department of
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,87 demonstrating the significant role
of the Japanese government in its creation. 88
At the time of its enactment in 1947, the Antimonopoly Act: 1)
prohibited anti-competitive agreements, private monopolies, unreasonable
differences in the strength of different enterprises, and the formation of
holding companies and control associations; 2) restricted mergers,
stockholding, transfer of management, and ownership of debt; 3) gave the
Japanese government the power to issue cease and desist orders for
violations of the Act and to levy fines; 4) allowed exemptions for small scale
trade associations; and 5) established the JFTC and gave it the power to act
independently and enforce the Antimonopoly Act.89  Provisions of the
80 The term "zaibatsu" references the large, family-controlled industrial combines of Japan. For
more information on zaibatsu, see generally HIDEMASA MORIKAWA, ZAIBATSU: THE RISE AND FALL OF
FAMILY ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN JAPAN (1992).
81 SUZUKI, supra note 73, at 18. Zaibatsu were replaced by keiretsu in later decades. Keiretsu are
similar in structure and purpose to zaibatsu. To read more about keiretsu and their continued existence in
Japan, see generally Bader, supra note 74. For an analysis of the antitrust implications of keiretsu, see Ely
Razin, Are the Keiretsu Anticompetitive?: Look to the Low, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 351 (1993).
82 HALEY, supra note 22, at 10.
I d. at 11.
s4Id. at 11-13.
85 IYORI, supra note 77. See also HALEY, supra note 22, at 7-42, for an interesting discussion of
competition in Japan during the era of cartel and zaibatsu domination. The author argues that competition
existed and that the U.S. insistence on an antimonopoly policy was more self-serving for the U.S. than
helpful to the Japanese economy.
86 ODA, supra note 12, at 300-01.
87 Hiroshi lyori, A Comparison of U.S.-Japan Antitrust Law: Looking at the International
Harmonization of Competition Law, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 59,65 (1995). This Department later became
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI").
88 See First, supra note 66, at 3-4.
89 Iyori, supra note 87, at 66; see also HALEY, supra note 22, at 71-72; John 0. Haley, Antitrust
Sanctions and Remedies: A Comparative Study of German and Japanese Law, 59 WASH. L. REV. 471, 487-
88 (1984).
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United States' Sherman and Clayton Acts embody many of the same ideals.
90
Much of the Antimonopoly Act remains the same today, despite
periodic amendments. 91 The first version of the Act was very stringent in its
outlining of antitrust violations, and Japan's more conservative factions
opposed it.92 Drafters worded the Antimonopoly Act broadly with both very
general and specific prohibitions that reached beyond the scope of American
legislation.93 Amendments in 1949 and 1953 weakened the force of the
Antimonopoly Act.94  However, a 1977 amendment added new provisions
and somewhat "restored in new guise earlier deletions."
95
B. The Japan Fair Trade Commission Enforces the Antimonopoly Act to
Maintain Fair Competition
The original Antimonopoly Act created the JFTC and enumerated its
powers and duties.9 6 In turn, the JFTFC enforces the Antimonopoly Act and
investigates violations.97 The JFTC is an administrative organization with
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions. 98 Its quasi-legislative function
gives it the power to draft binding rules and guidelines on enforcing and
interpreting the Antimonopoly Act's language.99 Its quasi-judicial powers
allow it to investigate and compel testimony from relevant parties and issue
recommendations and decisions. 100 Violators of the Antimonopoly Act
usually follow the JFTC's recommendation decisions.' 0 l A general sense
exists in Japanese society that significant errors in the JFTC's process are
unlikely because of the existence of procedural safeguards such as
investigation and hearings.l°2
90 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2004); see
also Yoshikazu Kawai, Competition Policy and Industrial Policy in Japan, in INTERNATIONAL
HARMONIZATION OF COMPETrION LAWS 47 (Chih-Kang Wang et. al. eds., 1995) (noting that the
Antimonopoly Act was modeled after U.S. antitrust law).
91 See IYORI & UESUGI, ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS & POLICIES, supra note 19, at 30-66.
92 BEEMAN, supra note 79, at 15-16.
93 HALEY, supra note 22, at 71.
94 See MATSUSHITA, supra note 69, at 78-80; BEEMAN, supra note 79, at 16-17.
95 HALEY, supra note 22, at 71. For example, the amendment disallowed the formation of business
conglomerates for any reason. It also suppressed abusive conduct by big businesses and introduced a
surcharge system against cartels. See lyori, supra note 67, at 44.
96 Antimonopoly Act, supra note 3, §§ 27-76.
97 See ABA ANTITRUST, COMPETITION LAWS, supra note 70, at 58.
98 BEEMAN, supra note 79, at 27.
99 Id.
10o Id.
'o' IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 19, at 220
102 HALEY, supra note 22, at 105.
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Adjudication by the JFTC involves four phases.103 Phase one includes
the initial review of complaints and the preliminary investigation. If the
JFTC deems it necessary, it may order a formal investigation, thus
commencing phase two.' 4 If the JFTC refuses to formally investigate, the
complainant has little ability to press the issue. 105  The JFTC may compel
witnesses or experts to appear and testify, order the submission of
documents pertinent to the investigation, and enter a place of business to
inspect conditions of the business operation. 106 Phase three includes initial
recommendation decisions and adjudicatory hearings.'0 7 During this phase,
investigators issue reports of their findings to the commissioners who, in
turn, issue a recommendation based on the reports.1°8 If the alleged violator
accepts the terms of this decision, it is legally binding. 10 9 An initial hearing
session, following the adversarial format of a Japanese trial, occurs if the
violator rejects the recommendation decision." 0 Consent decisions"' and
final contested (or formal) decisions result during phase four of the
adjudication process." 2  The violator may contest the decision and appeal
the final decision to the Tokyo High Court."13
C. Microsoft's Alleged Antitrust Violation May Constitute an Unfair
Trade Practice Under the Antimonopoly Act
Cartels, restraints of trade, and unfair trade practices thwart many
goals of the Japanese economy." 14  The Antimonopoly Act attempts to
103 See HALEY, supra note 22, at 116-124.
104 Id.
'05 Id. at 119. See also IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 19, at 219 (noting that the JFTC's decision to
drop a case may not be appealed in court); Toshiaki Takigawa, The Prospect of Antitrust Law and Policy in
the Twenty-First Century: In Reference to the Japanese Antimonopoly Law and Japan Fair Trade
Commission, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 275, 298-99 (2002) (noting that Japanese citizens can
bring suit to recover damages and, more recently, injunctive relief, but this rarely occurs due to stringent
causation and damages standards).
106 Antimonopoly Act, supra note 3, § 46(1)(i)-(iv).
07 HALEY, supra note 22, at 120.
508 Id.
109 Mitsuo Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 151, 158
(Edward M. Graham & 1. David Richardson eds., 1997).
"o HALEY, supra note 22, at 121.
' Consent decisions arise when the violator submits a written statement admitting the findings of
fact and application of laws and agreeing to accept the decision without further proceedings. It is an
opportunity for the violator of the Act to consent to the recommendations of the JFFC before a final
decision is made. Formal decisions results after completion of the hearing proceedings. See IYORI &
UESUGI, supra note 19, at 226.
1:2 HALEY, supra note 22, at 123.
13 id.
114 See First, supra note 66, at 45-46.
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achieve a number of economic goals, including: promoting free and fair
competition, stimulating initiative, encouraging business activities, raising
employment and real income levels, and ensuring consumer benefits." 5 To
ensure realization of these goals, the Antimonopoly Act prohibits
monopolization, unreasonable restraints on trade, and unfair trade
practices. 116  Additionally, it prevents disproportionate concentrations of
economic power and eliminates unfair restrictions on business activities.'
17
The alleged Microsoft violation relates to unfair trade practices.
Section 19 of the Antimonopoly Act states: "No entrepreneur shall employ
unfair trade practices.""' 8 While the JFTC can order criminal penalties for
monopolizing and creating unreasonable restraints of trade, 19 it cannot do so
for unfair trade practices. 120  It may order the violator to cease and desist
engaging in the activity, or require the company or entrepreneur to delete the
relevant provisions from the licensing agreement and take any other
measures necessary to eliminate the infringing act.'
21
Microsoft's commanding market share, combined with its use of a
NAP provision, may well constitute an unfair trade practice under Section
19. The General Designations For Unfair Trade Practices ("General
Designations"), guidelines drafted by the JFTC and used to help interpret the
Antimonopoly Act, include a broad list of actions that fall under the rubric of
unfair trade practices.122  Particularly relevant to Microsoft's case is the
General Designations' indication that abusing a dominant bargaining
position is an unfair trade practice. 123 Microsoft controls ninety to ninety-
five percent of the personal computer market in Japan. 124 As a result, it has a
dominant bargaining position when negotiating licensing agreements with
other less powerful companies.
115 U.N. COMM'N ON INV., TECH., AND RELATED FIN. ISSUES, ISSUES RELATED TO COMPETITION LAW
OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT: PREPARATIONS FOR A HANDBOOK ON COMPETITION
LEGISLATION at 11, U.N. DOC. TDIB/COM.2/CLP/6 (1998) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON COMPETITION
LEGISLATION].
116 Antimonopoly Act, supra note 3, § 2(9).
117 See HANDBOOK ON COMPETITION LEGISLATION, supra note 115, at 11.
IIS Antimonopoly Act, supra note 3, § 19.
119 Id. § 2(9). Unreasonable restraint of trade refers to cartels among companies, while unfair trade
practices include many types of behavior that can impede market competition. See id. § 2(6) and § 2(9).
120 See Newberg, supra note 72, at 716.
:21 Antimonopoly Act, supra note 3, at ch. V § 20.
122 See GENERAL DESIGNATIONS, supra note 24, at 1-4; ABA ANTITRUST, COMPETITION LAWS, supra
note 70, at 29-30.
"2 GENERAL DESIGNATIONS, supra note 24, at 3-4.
124 See Nakamoto, supra note 21. See also JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 2 (describing the
portion of the market controlled by Microsoft).
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Another document that the JFTC uses to interpret the Antimonopoly
Act, the Guidelines for Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements
("Guidelines"), describes a provision almost exactly like the one used by
Microsoft to demonstrate how such provisions can violate the Act when used
in conjunction with a dominant bargaining position. 125  The Guidelines
describe a dominant bargaining position as one in which "the licensee is
obliged to accept the licensor's requests even if they are excessively
disadvantageous to the licensee, because the licensor's denial or suspension
of technology transaction would present major obstacles to the licensee's
business. '12 This refers to a licensor with a large market share who may be
able to use its position and the licensee's need for its product to force the
licensee into accepting an unfavorable contract provision. The Guidelines
also note that an unjust disadvantage for the licensee results when an
agreement does not allow the licensee to assert its patent rights.
12 7
Microsoft's large market share forces licensees into accepting the
NAP provision when their bargaining position is weaker than that of
Microsoft. The NAP provision obliges licensees to accept Microsoft's
requests to refrain from asserting their technology patents, even though these
requests may be excessively disadvantageous to the licensee. 128  Since
Microsoft's behavior in inserting NAP provisions into its licensing
agreements seems to fall within the descriptions of abuse of dominant
bargaining position in the General Designations and the Guidelines, it may
constitute an unfair trade practice in Japan. 12 9 Therefore, Microsoft may be
in violation of the Antimonopoly Act when dealing with a company whose
bargaining position is far below that of Microsoft.
The JFTC, as the enforcer of the Antimonopoly Act, generally has the
responsibility of investigating and deciding whether to bring charges against
a company like Microsoft for violations of the Act. The JFTC has
recommended that Microsoft remove the NAP provision from licensing
agreements with Japanese OEMs, concluding that it constitutes an unfair
trade practice. Microsoft is contesting the JFTC's recommendation and will
continue to fight any subsequent rulings that are not in its favor.
1 3 0
125 See GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING, supra note 16, at 17-19.
126 Id. at 19.
127 id.
128 For the text of a typical NAP provision, see supra Part n.A.129 See GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNow-How LICENSING, supra note 16, at 19.
130 See Paul Kallender, Microsoft, Japanese Regulators Meet Over License Terms, INFOWORLD
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7, 2005.
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IV. THE JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION Is MAKING AN EXAMPLE OF A
SOFTWARE GIANT
Microsoft had been using the non-assertion of patents provision for
nearly ten years without incident when Japan decided to challenge its use
under the Antimonopoly Act.' 3 1 PC manufacturers repeatedly complained
about the trade ramifications of the NAP provision, prompting the JFTC to
raid Microsoft's offices.' 32 After an investigation, the JFTC recommended
that Microsoft remove the provision from all present and future agreements,
also citing another clause in the licensing agreements that made the NAP
provision effective for up to three years after the licenses expire.
133
Microsoft removed the provision from future licensing agreements, citing a
change in the atmosphere of technology licensing,' 34 but refused to remove it
from existing contracts, arguing that it was a legal protection from costly
lawsuits. 135  After the investigation and ensuing recommendation,
Microsoft's refusal to comply triggered a round of hearings between the
JFTC and Microsoft. 13 6 Little progress has been made in recent meetings
with the JFTC. Both parties expect negotiations and hearings to continue
through 2006 before they reach a resolution.
37
A. Phase One: The JFTC Investigates Microsoft's Licensing Practices
for Potential Antitrust Violations
As a result of complaints by PC manufacturers, 13 investigators raided
Microsoft Corporation's Tokyo headquarters as part of an attempt to
investigate the licensing agreements and the company's software supply
practices for computers in Japan.' 39 Although JFTC officials indicated that
131 See Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8. See, e.g., Case 66/85, Bayer AG v. Sullhofer, 1988
E.C.R. 5287, 4 C.M.L.R. 182 (1988); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Foster v. Hallco Mfg Co.,
947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (cases examining provisions concerning assertion of patent rights).
132 See Regulators Conduct Search of Microsoft's Office in Tokyo, supra note 1.
133 See JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 3-4 (indicating that a "Survival Provision" precludes
OEMs from asserting patent rights for up to three years after termination of the license).
134 Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8.
135 Yuri Kageyama, Drop Contract Clause, Japan Tells Microsoft: Wording Sparks Patent Concerns,
Japanese Firms Fear Possible Infringement, SEATLE TIMES, July 14, 2004, at D3 [hereinafter Kageyama,
Drop Contract].
36 See HALEY, supra note 22, at 120-21.
'37 See Yuri Kageyama, Microsoft Says Japan Battle Hurting Image, CRN AP, Aug. 10, 2004,
available at http://www.crn.conmsections/breakingnews/dailyarchives.jhtml;jsessionid=5PKZDGYHPQ3E
CQSNDBCCKHOCJUMEKJVN?articleld=26806928 (last visited May 31, 2005).
138 JFTC Press Release, supra note 2.
139 See Microsoft Offices in Tokyo Raided by Japan Trade Officials, supra note 1.
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they were not certain whether Microsoft had violated any patents, 140 they
said that they believed use of the NAP provision in this situation was anti-
competitive. Microsoft removed the provision from all future contracts of
its own accord and not in response to the actions of the JFTC. 142  The
company issued a statement noting that there had been gradual changes in
the information technology marketplace and that it was moving toward a
"new [intellectual property] policy based on expanded licensing of its
intellectual property rights with others in the industry."' 143 As a result, the
provision would no longer be needed. 144
B. Phase Two: The JFTC Recommends That Microsoft Remove the Non-
Assertion of Patents Provision from Future and Existing Licensing
Agreements with Japanese PC Manufacturers
After concluding its investigation, the JFTC issued a recommendation
that Microsoft immediately remove the non-assertion of patents provision in
current and previous agreements with Japanese PC manufacturers. 45  It
found Microsoft in violation of the unfair trade practices section of the
Antimonopoly Act. 146 Although Microsoft had already announced that it
would remove the provision from future licensing agreements, the JFTC was
concerned with existing licensing agreements as well. 147 Present licensees
would not be able to claim any patent infringements for three years after
they stopped distributing personal computers running the Microsoft software
they had licensed. 1
48
The JFTC gave Microsoft two weeks to accept or reject the
recommendation. 149  If it had chosen to accept the recommendation, the
decision would have been binding. 150  Microsoft rejected the
recommendation to remove the NAP provision from existing contracts and
:4 Kageyama, supra note 135.
41 Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Statement by Microsoft Corporation on Reports of Japanese Fair
Trade Commission Inquiry (Feb. 26, 2004), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2004/
Feb04/02-26JF1'CStatement.asp (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter Statement by Microsoft II].
142 See Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8. See also, Microsoft Joint Status Report, supra note 31,
at 7 (status report on the U.S. action against Microsoft noting the company had removed the NAP provision
from future licensing agreements).
143 Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8.
4 See Kageyama, supra note 137.
45 See JFTC Decision, supra note 2; JFTC Press Release, supra note 2.
146 JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 1.
147 id.
' Id. at 4.
149 Michiyo Nakamoto, Microsoft Given Fair Trade Slap, FIN. TIMES ASIA, July 14, 2004.
so HALEY, supra note 22, at 120.
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decided to contest the decision.
1 51
The Antimonopoly Act text is vague in its description of violations.
The description within the Antimonopoly Act concerning unfair trade
practices merely states that: "[n]o entrepreneur shall employ unfair trade
,,152practices. However, section 2(9)(v) of the Act describes unfair trade
practices as those including dealing with another party by unjust use of one's
bargaining position. 15 3 Section 14 of the General Designations defines abuse
of a dominant bargaining position as doing any number of specified acts
"unjustly in the light of the normal business practices, by making use of
one's dominant bargaining position over the other party," including
"imposing a disadvantage on the said party regarding terms or execution of
transaction."'
' 54
The Guidelines1 55 provide direction for enforcing the Antimonopoly
Act in the area of licensing agreements.' 56  They divide restrictions on
competition into three categories: 1) restrictions that do not constitute unfair
trade practices because they have a negligible effect on competition in a
market; 57 2) restrictions that may be unfair trade practices and are evaluated
based on the specific situation, content of the restriction, position of the
licensor and licensee, market conditions, and the duration of the restriction
in question; 58 and 3) restrictions that are highly likely to constitute unfair
trade practices because they have adverse effects on market competition.' 59
The Guidelines contain a section entitled "Obligation not to assert the
licensee's patent rights" that indicates some restrictions in licensing
agreements are antitrust violations.' 60 For example, a restrictive provision in
a licensing agreement that has an adverse effect on market competition and
is an abuse of a dominant bargaining position constitutes an unfair trade
practice and thus violates the Antimonopoly Act. 161 The Guidelines further
indicate that any restriction impeding incentives to engage in research and
development of new technologies by limiting the exercise of patent rights is
151 Microsoft Filing Complaint Against Japan FTC, supra note 11.
152 Antimonopoly Act, supra note 3, § 19.
153 Id. § 2(9)(v).
154 GENERAL DESIGNATIONS, supra note 24, at 3. The General Designations were created by the
JFTC to help interpret the Antimonopoly Act.
155 These Guidelines were drafted by the JFTC to aid in interpretation of some of the clauses
concerning technology licensing in the Antimonopoly Act. See GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW
LICENSING, supra note 16, at 3.
156 See GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING, supra note 16, at 3-5.
157 Id. at 4.
158 id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 28.
161 Newberg, supra note 72, at 739-40.
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also a violation of the Antimonopoly Act.1 62 This section seems to apply to
NAP provisions. Thus, the Guidelines directly guide the JFTC to interpret
the Antimonopoly Act as prohibiting NAP provisions as an unfair trade
practice if they impede invention or enhance the licensor's position through
abuse of a dominant bargaining position.
The Guidelines reflect the overall policy goal of providing incentive
for OEM innovation and development by ensuring that they are able to
assert their patent rights. 163  NAP provisions appear to be problematic in
some situations and some treatises caution practitioners that restricting a
licensee's ability to assert patent rights could violate Japanese antitrust
law 64 To promote the goals of innovation and development, the JFTC
recommended that Microsoft remove the NAP provision from licensing
agreements with Japanese PC manufacturers.
165
C. Phase Three: Contesting the JFTC's Recommendation Decision and
Commencing Adjudicatory Hearings
Microsoft rejected the JFTC's recommendation decision, 166 which
resulted in hearings before neutral commissioners to decide whether to issue
a final decision in the matter. 167 Microsoft indicated that it wanted the JFTC
to hear its reasons for including the NAP provision in its licensing
agreements with PC manufacturers.' 68  During the first round of the
hearings, Microsoft stated that it intended to contest the JFTC's decision
regarding the NAP provision because it believed in the provision's general
legality. 169 Microsoft and the JFFC met again for a second shorter meeting
to discuss their respective positions and to allow Microsoft to prepare its
refutation. 70 Microsoft Japan's president and JFTC officials indicated that
they believed the legal battle could last as long as two years.
17 1
162 GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-How LICENSING, supra note 16, at 19.
163 This is reflected in the JFTC's inclusion of a specific section on assertion of licensee's patent
rights in the Guidelines. See GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING, supra note 16, at 19.
164 See, e.g., SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 34, § 31:32 (noting that a provision prohibiting a licensee from
exercising patent rights against the licensor is considered an unfair trade practice in Japan if it has an
adverse effect on market competition).
115 See JFFC Press Release, supra note 2, at 5-6.
166 See Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8.
167 See Recent Licensing Agreements in Japan, ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Sept. 30, 2004, at 36;
HALEY, supra note 22, at 120.
168 See Staff Reporter, Japan Warns Microsoft Over "Unfair" Licensing Deals for Japan PC Makers,
XINHUA ECONOMIC NEWS, July 13, 2004.
:69 See Kageyama, supra note 21, at 62.
170 See Paul Kallender, Japan's FTC, Microsoft Meet Again in Licensing Case, IDG NEWS SERVICE,
Dec. 21, 2004.
171 Kageyama, supra note 137.
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Microsoft will present its case to the JFTC and hope for a favorable
determination. In the end, the JFTC may issue a final decision, which will
be binding on the legality of Microsoft's NAP provision in Japan.172
Microsoft can choose to accept a consent decision before such final
adjudication. 73 Otherwise, it will have to wait until the end of the hearings
to appeal the final decision to the Tokyo High Court. 174
The JFTC's adjudication process proceeds slowly through many
different phases.1 75 As a result, Microsoft can expect a long battle over the
legality of its NAP provisions in Japan. The company risks further damage
to its image due to continued media coverage. However, the economic and
legal implications tied to the removal of the provision from existing
contracts necessitates Microsoft's continued defense of it.
V. MICROSOFT'S REACTION TO THE JFTC DECISION POTENTIALLY OPENS A
PANDORA'S Box OF PROBLEMS
Microsoft has taken a stand against the JFTC and continues to tout the
legality of the NAP provision.1 76  Japan's public rejection of the provision
could lead to potential problems for Microsoft on a global scale.' 77  The
public scrutiny may cause other countries to examine the use of Microsoft's
NAP provision under their own antitrust regimes. Although a provision
similar to the NAP provision was upheld in the European Union, the
European Court of Justice noted that it would utilize a case-by-case
approach to analyze its validity.178 This suggests that the European Union
may still invalidate a provision inhibiting competitive behavior by a licensee
as a violation of EU antitrust law, although the European Commission
172 HALEY, supra note 22, at 121-24. See supra Part III for a discussion of the general process and
procedures involved when the JFrC brings an action against an Antimonopoly Act violation.
171 See IYORI& UESUG, supra note 19, at 226-27.
174 HALEY, supra note 22, at 122.
75 See HALEY, supra note 22, at 116-25 for a discussion of the different phases of a JFrC
investigation and adjudication.176 See Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8.
177 The JFTC's scrutiny of Microsoft comes immediately after Microsoft was fined a large sum and
ordered to alter the way it deals with OEMs in the European Union. See Commission Decision of Mar. 24,
2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft. The European Commission Decision came shortly after
Microsoft was convicted of antitrust violations in the United States. See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). However, Microsoft is usually able to settle in these situations. While the JFTC may
force Microsoft to moderate its behavior, a fine is unlikely. See e.g., Microsoft Joint Status Report, supra
note 31 (displaying the United States judgment and settlement agreement which did not include a fine);
Anti-trust Battles Leave Microsoft Dented but Undefeated, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 2, 2004, at 2;
Yuri Kageyama, Japan to Warn Microsoft, but Fine Unlikely, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 10, 2004, at 32
(indicating that the JFTC is unlikely to fine Microsoft).1S See Case 66/85, Bayer AG v. Sullhofer, 1988 E.C.R. 5287,4 C.M.L.R. 182 (1988).
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neglected to challenge the NAP provision when it recently charged
Microsoft with massive antitrust violations. 179 This could lead to a major
backlash against the NAP provision and an order to remove it from
Microsoft's licensing agreements in Europe.
In addition to the potential legal ramifications, practical perils also
exist. If Microsoft uses its clout to fight the JFTC over the legality of a
provision that it has already removed from future contracts, it could appear
to be harassing the JFTC. The legal battle has already begun to damage
Microsoft's image in Japan and abroad.'
80
Although Microsoft's decision to fight the JFTC caused negative
publicity, the company has many valid reasons for defending the NAP
provision. While it is unlikely that the United States would challenge the
NAP provision because it already had the opportunity and decided not to
pursue it,' 8' regulatory agencies in other countries may feel compelled to
examine the provision should the JFTC find it to be illegal. Microsoft would
not have the opportunity to renegotiate existing contracts and bring them in
line with future agreements. There could potentially be an onslaught of
litigation by OEMs worldwide should Microsoft be forced to remove the
provision from existing contracts in Japan.
A. The JFTC Targeted Microsoft Because of Its Size in an Attempt to
Encourage Development and Innovation
There are a number of reasons why the JFTC may have targeted
Microsoft. First, it is likely that the JFTC's decision to target Microsoft
stems from the company's command of a majority of the PC market share in
Japan. The JFTC's challenge originated with an engineer at a Japanese
OEM, who issued a complaint claiming the company's technology was
potentially appropriated and used in Microsoft's Windows operating systems
and media players. 182  Others subsequently lodged similar complaints
regarding the NAP provision in Microsoft's contracts,' 83 indicating that,
because other operating systems are rarely used, they feel the need to obtain
the license for the Windows operating system in order to be competitive in
the market. 84 This is akin to Microsoft using its dominant bargaining
'9 See Commission Decision of Mar. 24, 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft.
180 Kageyama, supra note 137.
181 See Microsoft Joint Status Report, supra note 31, at 7; U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 61-62
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
'82 See FTC Orders Microsoft to Stop Restrictive Licensing Practices, NLKKEI REPORT, July 14, 2004.
183 See JFTC Press Release, supra note 2.
194 id.
VOL. 14 No. 3
JAPAN'S ANTIMONOPOLYACTAND MICROSOFT
position and virtual monopoly of the market to get OEMs to sign its
licensing agreement.
185
Second, the NAP provision could give Microsoft an advantage by
quelling initiative for development of new technology. 186  This way,
Microsoft ensures that its technology will be the most advanced on the
market and licensees will continue to need it. The JFTC may have targeted
Microsoft because of the PC manufacturers' perceived need to use Microsoft
technology. Microsoft software is used in ninety to ninety-five percent of
the country's personal computers, and many PC manufacturers feel they
need to offer it to consumers to compete in the market. 187 This command of
the market reflects Microsoft's great market power. However, even if
manufacturers feel compelled to utilize Microsoft's software, many of them
are also very large companies that command a great deal of bargaining
power. 88 They generally have significant leverage to negotiate favorable
deals for themselves. Microsoft's inclusion of the NAP provision may
actually serve the interests of both Microsoft and its licensees by keeping
transaction costs down and making the licenses more affordable.
1 89
Third, the JFTC's decision on NAP provisions may also be motivated
by a desire to have a moderating effect on the company. 90 Under this
rationale, Microsoft might choose to moderate its behavior and allow
manufacturers more leverage in negotiating licensing agreements and
asserting their patent rights in order to avoid any adverse publicity related to
anticompetitive behavior. The recommendations and hearings may have
such an effect even if the JFTC never renders a final decision in the matter.
The JFTC publishes its recommendations and accompanying media report.
This adverse publicity may be a deterrent in and of itself.
91
Fourth, the JFTC may be focusing on Microsoft due to its desire to
foster the development and growth of other software companies so that
manufacturers are not as dependent on Microsoft technology. Perhaps the
JFTC wants to curb potentially monopolistic behavior and give other
systems like Linux the opportunity to gain a foothold in the market. Indeed,
185 See GENERAL DESIGNATIONS, supra note 24, at 3-4.
186 See JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 3-5.
"g7 Id. at 2-3.188 Japanese PC manufacturers include large, powerful companies such as Toshiba, Fujitsu, Sony,
Sharp, Mitsubishi and Hitachi, among others. See John Boyd, From Chaos to Competition: Japan's PC
Industry in Transformation, COMPUTING JAPAN ONLINE, Apr. 1997, at http://www.cjmag.co.jp/magazinel
issues/1997/apr97/chaos.htmil (last visited May 31, 2005).
189 See JFTC Press Release, supra note 2; Nakamoto, Microsoft is Told to Alter Policy, supra note 21.
'90 See Anti-trust Battles Leave Microsoft Dented But Undefeated, supra note 177.
191 HALEY, supra note 22, at 170.
192 JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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some PC manufacturers are starting to use Linux and other open source 9 3
software, which are steadily gaining popularity.
194
The JFTC's focus on Microsoft comes from a desire to make the
company an example and force other companies to reevaluate the use of the
NAP provision in light of their bargaining positions. There is a chance that
the JFTC's scrutiny of Microsoft's NAP provision could lead to an
examination of provisions used by other software companies. However,
unless the company possesses a significant market share or aggravating
circumstances exist, giving it a dominant bargaining position or coercive
power, it is unlikely that the JFTC would look closely at its licensing
agreements. 
195
Finally, very few actions are per se illegal under the Antimonopoly
Act. 196  The JFTC evaluates most intellectual property licensing restraints
under the rule of reason. 197  This means that restraints are not illegal by
themselves: other circumstances198 must exist resulting in the alleged unfair
trade practice restricting competition. 99 In Microsoft's case, its control of
the market ensures that PC manufacturers need to license Windows software
in order to compete with other OEMs and sell their product. By
vociferously pursuing the use of NAP provisions despite Microsoft's
agreement to remove it from future licensing agreements, the JFTC is
making Microsoft an example to send a message to other companies with
large market shares that they are not exempt from scrutiny under the
Antimonopoly Act.2°°
193 "Open source" refers to software and operating systems whose programming source code is
available to the customer. Open source software makes it easier for manufacturers to alter the programs to
work more efficiently with their computers. See Commission Decision of Mar. 24, 2004, Case COMP/C-
3/37.792 Microsoft, at 10-11 for a description of open source software.
194 See Kevin O'Brien, New Wave Hits Software Industry: Open-source Pioneers Shake Up Bigger
Rivals, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 30, 2004, at I (noting Microsoft's announcement of a decrease in sales
and revenue due to the increasing market acceptance of open-source software like Linux); Clement Teo,
Living with Linux, NETWORK COMPUTING ASIA, July 2, 2004 (indicating growth statistics for Linux).
"5 GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING, supra note 16, at 18-19.
196 See Newberg, supra note 72, at 739-41. Newberg notes that licensing restraints that may
constitute unfair trade practices are divided into different categories depending on the likelihood that they
are a violation of the Antimonopoly Act. Id. NAP provisions are found on the "grey" list, indicating that
they are not a per se violation. Id. See also GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING, supra
note 16; Antimonopoly Act, supra note 3, § 2(9).
:97 Newberg, supra note 72 at 746.
198 Circumstances such as a dominant bargaining position or an additional clause lengthening the
effectiveness of the restraint beyond termination of the license increase the chance of a finding that the
restraint is an unfair trade practice. See GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING, supra note
16, at 17-19.
"9 GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING, supra note 16, at 18-19.
200 See Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8; Statement by Microsoft II, supra note 141.
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Therefore, Microsoft's command of the market and the extended
duration of the NAP provision beyond termination of the license combined
to encourage the JFTC to challenge Microsoft.
B. The JFTC Crackdown May Negatively Affect Microsoft in Several
Ways
More adverse publicity could call attention to Microsoft's NAP
provision elsewhere in the world because the JFTC's decisions are made
public. Shortly after the U.S. Department of Justice looked into Microsoft's
software bundling and tying practices in the United States, the European
Commission began looking into similar practices in the European Union.2 °1
While this may not have been the EU's only reason for its examination of
Microsoft's practices, the timing coincided with the U.S. scrutiny of
Microsoft.
Should Japan find the provision to be illegal, other countries may
follow suit. This could lead to numerous lawsuits in countries with more
stringent systems for punishing antitrust violations.20 2 In order to avoid this,
Microsoft should continue to defend the NAP provision.
C. Removing the Provision from Existing Contracts and Licensing
Agreements Has Potential Legal Implications
Because Microsoft is such a large company, it appears that the NAP
provision may have outlived its original purpose. Microsoft now holds a
large number of patents and has developed to the point where other methods
of protecting itself, such as cross-licensing agreements, are just as useful.20 3
In a cross-licensing agreement, the licensee company allows Microsoft to
use its technology in exchange for using Microsoft's software.20 4  Under
such reciprocal arrangements, neither company can sue for patent violations.
Microsoft itself has indicated that the NAP provision is no longer as useful
205for the company as it once was.
201 See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-62 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Commission Decision of Mar.
24, 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft.
202 HALEY, supra note 22, at 115-20. The Antimonopoly Act does not provide criminal sanctions for
violating the unfair trade practices provision. Id. at 72. Instead, it provides for open-ended remedial
powers rather than fines as the enforcement mechanism of choice. Id. at 144. Rarely do JFTC cases
proceed beyond the initial stages. Most of them are settled within the first phases of JFTC action. Id. at
116.
203 See FTC Orders Microsoft to Stop Restrictive Licensing Practices, supra note 182.
204 See BATrERSBY & GRIMES, supra note 27, § 4:20.
205 See Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8; FTC Orders Microsoft to Stop Restrictive Licensing
Practices, supra note 182.
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The question remains as to why Microsoft is reluctant to remove the
NAP provision from existing contracts if changes in the information
technology marketplace render the provision unnecessary.206 Microsoft may
want to ensure that the NAP provision is validated in order to foreclose
attempts by other governments to challenge it under their antitrust laws.
Another reason for Microsoft to pursue the issue is that removal of the
NAP provision from existing licensing agreements or a finding of illeality
could make Microsoft vulnerable to lawsuits for patent infringement. 20 The
company is currently creating a new intellectual property policy and
expanding licensing of intellectual property rights.2°8 This new policy will
likely include protections that create an effect similar to that of the NAP
provision, but without the severe limitations on licensees. However, the
agreements currently in existence do not include any protections in
accordance with the new policy. Microsoft would not have the opportunity
to renegotiate existing agreements once it removes the NAP provision.
Thus, a finding of illegality could cause PC manufacturers and OEMs to
look for their proprietary technology in the Windows operating system,
potentially leading to patent infringement actions against Microsoft.
Yet another possible adverse reaction could be lawsuits against end
users, consumers, or other intermediary licensees of Microsoft's technology.
Individual technology developers and companies could sue the customer for
using patents they did not purchase or license. When a consumer buys a
computer, he is paying only for the license to the software and not for any of
the technology that is incorporated into the operating system. While this is
not likely to happen, the possibility of consumers being vulnerable to patent
infringement lawsuits still exists.
Removal of the NAP provision could lead to increased transaction
costs and a subsequent increase in the price of a technology license.20 9
Additionally, removal of NAP provisions from existing contracts could have
particular effects in Japan. The JFTC action against Microsoft already
garnered so much publicity210 that a finding that the NAP provision is illegal,
followed by its subsequent removal, could lead to a flood of scrutiny of
206 See Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8 (noting changes in the information technology
marketplace led them to change their licensing policies).
2 See Japan Raid Seen to Affect Microsoft's Fight With Linux, JlII PRESS ENGLISH NEWS SERVICE,
Feb. 26, 2004.
208 Statement by Microsoft, supra note 8.
209 See BRUNSVOLD & O'REILLEY, supra note 7, at 17; Nakamoto, supra note 32.
210 See Nakamoto, supra note 21.
VOL. 14 No. 3
JAPAN'S ANTIMONOPOLYACTAND MICROSOFT
license agreements and a potentially large number of lawsuits. 211 Because of
the widespread potential negative effects tied to a finding of illegality,
Microsoft should continue to defend the provision and appeal any
unfavorable rulings.
D. Removal of the NAP Provision May Allow PC Manufacturers and
Other OEMs to Negotiate More Favorable Licensing Agreements
The removal of the NAP provision could benefit PC manufacturers,
but might cause problems for Microsoft. Individuals and companies may be
able to negotiate more favorable licensing and royalty agreements.
212
However, many of these companies' bargaining positions rival that of
Microsoft.213
Eradicating the NAP provision in existing and future contracts could
lead to more technological development with the knowledge that the results
are protected from unauthorized use.214  The JFFC enforces the
Antimonopoly Act to foster competition and allow for the development of
new technology and growth.21 5 One of the concerns regarding the NAP
provision is the creation of a disincentive to develop new technology.216 If
proprietary technology can be incorporated into Microsoft's software
without royalties or the ability to assert patent rights, there is less incentive
217to create any new technologies. However, NAP provisions are sometimes
reciprocal and also protect the licensee. In current licensing agreements,
should the provision be removed, licensees will also be open to litigation.
Another concern of the JFTC and PC manufacturers is that existing
licensing agreements give Microsoft access to information about new
technology developments that it could incorporate into its software without
having to pay royalties. 218 The NAP provision could also give competitors
using Windows operating systems access to the OEM's proprietary
21 See, e.g., JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that a number of Japanese OEMs fear
their patents are being infringed upon by Microsoft).
See, e.g., JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 3-4 (noting that numerous OEMs felt compelled to
accept the NAP provision despite its disadvantages).
213 PC manufacturers include Fujitsu, Hitachi, Sony, and Toshiba, all large companies in their own
right. See Yoshiko Hara, Intel Gains Extension in Japanese Antitrust Probe, INFO. WEEK, Mar. 18, 2005,
available at http://informationweek.comIstory/showArticle.jhtnl?articlelD=15 9 9 024 44 (last visited Apr. 6,
2005).
214 See JFTC Press Release, supra note 2, at 4-5.
215 For a description of the purpose of the Antimonopoly Act and the JFTC's enforcement, see supra
Part IIB.
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technology.219  There is no indication that any of these unsavory
circumstances have occurred.22 °  Investigators have no evidence that
Microsoft has violated any OEM patents.221
Although removal of the NAP provision may aid PC manufacturers,
many of them possess formidable bargaining power as well. The benefits of
leaving the provision in existing licensing agreements far outweigh
immediate detriments to Japanese OEMs that would ensue from its removal.
Microsoft's decision to fight the JFTC seems logical in light of the potential
problems that might occur should the provision be removed from existing
licensing agreements.
E. The Overall Benefits of the NAP Provision Outweigh Any Potential
Setbacks in Innovation
Discontinuing the provision in existing contracts is likely to produce
unfavorable results overall. Although it rehabilitates Microsoft's image and
demonstrates that the company is willing to acknowledge PC manufacturers'
proprietary interests and patent rights, it opens up a Pandora's Box of
problems. Additionally, the OEMs are often large companies with
bargaining power of their own. Removal of the provision from existing
contracts could give them carte blanche to use their power against Microsoft
and sue the company for whatever potential patent infringements they can
find. Also, the NAP provision must be preserved for the use of smaller
companies that truly need its protection.
Removal of the provision might cause other countries to examine the
222NAP provision. If the NAP provision is found to be illegal under the
Japanese Antimonopoly Act, it might pose problems for Microsoft. It could
then be questioned on a global scale.
Microsoft could continue to contest the decision and eventually appeal
to the Tokyo High Court. However, the JFTC is unlikely to pursue the case
223to this extent. Most cases are settled in the initial, less formal phases of
224the JFTC's process. Also, a finding upholding the provision would be
worth any legal costs or negative publicity. Therefore, Microsoft should
219 See Kageyama, Japan to Warn Microsoft, supra note 177.220 See Kageyama, Japan Orders, supra note 43, at 78.221 See Kageyama, Drop Contract, supra note 135; JF'C Press Release, supra note 2.222 For example, Japan's scrutiny of Microsoft comes right after the European Commission levied ahefty fine on the software company for engaging in anticompetitive practices. See Commission Decision of
Mar. 24, 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft.
223 See Following Europe, Japan Takes Aim at Microsoft, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 4, 2004, at 103
(notin that a fine is unlikely).
HEATH, supra note 22, at 48.
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continue to defend the provision and ensure that it stays in existing licensing
agreements.
Microsoft should continue the battles with antitrust officials to protect
itself from a great volume of potential litigation. 25 Continuing to fight the
226JFTC decision might damage its reputation in Japan. Microsoft's Japan
unit acknowledged that "the U.S. software giant's battle with Japanese anti-
monopoly authorities over a controversial licensing clause has hurt its
corporate image here., 227 However, the damage is likely nominal and not a
crucial issue.228 Despite such damage to its image, the best plan would be
for Microsoft to defend the utility of NAP provisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Non-assertion of patents provisions can provide valuable protection
and prevent unnecessary and potentially costly patent infringement lawsuits
by protecting licensors from suit and causing licensees to consider potential
patent issues before signing the licensing agreement. However, when a
company has grown to a point where it can protect itself in other ways and
has gained virtual control of the market, a NAP provision provides less
utility. Microsoft's use of NAP provisions in its licensing agreements with
Japanese PC manufacturers is likely an unfair trade practice under the
Antimonopoly Act. Microsoft controls a large portion of the market and
could be construed as having a dominant bargaining position.
Nevertheless, Microsoft should continue to fight the JFFC. A formal
finding of illegality could lead to a potential outbreak of antitrust scrutiny of
the provision. Microsoft cannot renegotiate existing licensing agreements
should the provision be removed. As a result, it could be vulnerable to an
onslaught of litigation from OEMs. These often-large PC manufacturing
companies might use a formal finding of illegality as the opportunity to
search for any potential patent infringement in order to bring lawsuits
against Microsoft. While removing the non-assertion of patents provision
may encourage innovation, leaving it in existing agreements does not
necessarily prevent competition.
Perhaps the most important reason to defend the NAP provision is its
continued utility to many companies. Although Microsoft has indicated it
225 See The Associated Press, Microsoft Mounts Defense of Clause, SEAITLE TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at
C3 (noting that the NAP clause protects Microsoft from potential patent infringement lawsuits).
226 Kageyama, supra note 137.
227 Id.
228 Regulators Conduct Search of Microsoft's Office in Tokyo, supra note 1.
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will no longer use the provisions in future licensing agreements, this does
not mean that the NAP provision will not have utility for some companies.
NAP provisions keep transaction costs down, ensure that licenses will be
affordable, and protect everyone from costly and potentially unnecessary
patent litigation. To protect itself from potential problems and ensure that
others may use the provision in the future, Microsoft should continue to fight
the Japan Fair Trade Commission and defend the legality of the non-
assertion of patents provision in existing licensing agreements.
